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It is

the

of the
of

important

two

basic

most

adequacy

develop

to

not

the usefulness of

only

but also their limitations. One
limitations is in relation to study

statements

important
of working capital.

balance sheets and income

statements

is

not

arranged

for this purpose. In corporate
annual reports these statements are often supplemented
by a statement of flow of funds. Study of such state
to

as

so

facilitate its

Material contained in

is desirable for

use

number of

including the
light
periodic ac
for
of
counting
depreciation (amortization
cost) and
the provision of funds for replacements.
Security prospectuses and annual reports to share
holders are used as stimulating and realistic material for
presenting many of the topics covered. Students are in
troduced to SEC Regulation S-X, the general regulation
governing statements filed with the Commission, and to
the accounting series of releases.
A number of important areas of accounting are left
untouched because they are better studied in the law
courses themselves. This is true of
accounting for issu
ance and
of
for
dividend distribu
shares,
reacquisition
and
for
formal
reduction
of
tion,
capital stock and so
called "quasi-reorganization." The same is true of the
peculiarities of public utility accounting and of account
ing in relation to segregating principal and income when
ments

thus thrown

on

property is held in

a

reasons

the relation between

trust.

As

already suggested, the lawyer requires a critical
approach to accounting concepts. As an illustration of
such an approach, the readings include an imaginative
and witty article by Walton Hamilton on the limits of
accounting concepts and techniques. To test student
understanding of the article, I like to raise the question
as

to

whether Hamilton's attitude is

one

of hostile de

bunking. Last year a student immediately answered
that such a characterization would be quite unfair
that Hamilton
the

approach

merely applies

familiar

to our

of Dean Levi's Introduction
has

to accounting concepts
students from their study

to

that

Legal Reasoning.
few students have

Experience
suggested
against expecting too much from their knowl
edge of accounting. They need to be reminded that legal
questions concerning income usually involve questions
of interpretation which accounting principles, however
well settled, do not foreclose. Thus if it should become
recognized that as a matter of accounting depreciation
a

to

be warned

expense should be increased to take account of infla
tionary change in purchasing power, the resulting con
cept of income would not necessarily be applicable under
an

income bond indenture. To

income would

concept of
protection from the

apply

such

a

give shareholders a
impact of inflation at the expense of bondholders whose
maximum

return

is

yers.

adjusted in relation to decreased
learning something of accounting

not

purchasing power. In
analysis, law students

must

remember

to

think like law
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Law School

University of Chicago

Book Reviews-Home and Abroad
bring to the attention of the alumni two recent re
of books published by members of The Law School
Faculty. The first, a review of Allison Dunham's Modern
Real Estate Transactions: Cases and Materials, appeared
in the October, 1952, issue of the American Bar Associa
tion Journal. The second edition of Edward H. Levi's
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning was reviewed in the
April, 1952, edition of The Law Quarterly Review, pub
lished in England. Both reviews follow in their entirety.
We

views

Modern Real Estate Transactions: Cases and Materials.

By

ALLISON DUNHAM.

Brooklyn:

Foundation Press,

Inc., 1952! Pp. 1029. $8.50.

Concerning this book, the author, a professor of law
the University of Chicago, says that its objective "is

at

teaching purposes the legal con
marketing of land"; that
problems in house market
ing." House-building problems are not dealt with. Start
ing with the raw material, namely, the land on which
the housing structure is finally to stand, the problems of
processing the land for its intended use-zoning and
other restrictions imposed by public authority-are first
considered. Next come controls imposed by private agree
ment-easements, equitable servitudes and covenants
running with the land. Here are considered problems
of basic policy as to what restrictions and covenants may
for

bring together

to

cepts and institutions of the
"it is organized on the basis of

enforced, such

be

as

restraints

on

alienation, racial

re

strictions.

Problems in house

marketing

two-thirds of the
book. This is as it should be,
since few of the students who
occupy

use

some

this book will

subdividers
ers,

or

ever represent
wholesale build

but all of them will have

to

the

do with

problems affecting
leasing of housing struc
tures. This practical approach is
typical. The student will find
nothing here about the the Statsale

or

ute

of Uses,

or

De

Donis,

Allison Dun/lam

or

Quia Emptores. He will find something about the
Statute of Frauds, for that is an element entering into
almost every transaction affecting real property.
In a review of reasonable length, it is possible
to

mention

some

only
marketing problems dealt
an extent which will surprise
with such matters piecemeal

of the house

They cover a field of
lawyer who has dealt
as
they arise in practice. To enumerate a few: Who
participates in these transactions-buyer, seller, broker,
with.
the

mortgagee, escrow agent, attorneys for any
-and the laws or customs affecting their

or

all of these

participation;

documents and papers; when title passes; what consti
tutes performance; remedies of the parties; title prob-
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lems and methods of title

assurance.

The

concluding

deals with transfers of undivided interests.

chapter
Throughout

the work is valuable material

the

on

economic and social aspects of house market

historical,
ing and the preparation of land for residential

purposes.

directly
ploys a
Each

case.

Yet in their

theory.
presented a well-organized work in
which is drawn together from varied sources, not all of
them by any means what we commonly term "legal,"
a vast collection of material dealing with an important

ing by

He is

no

espouses

point

a

out

in his

preface,

careful and industrious

ex

who has

positor

field of the law.

The author calls his work

a

"coursebook." The

term

suggests casebook, plus something more, giving promise
which the work fulfils. It is in fact a source book, and
it has characteristics which we commonly associate with
a

well-written textbooks. For that reason, I have no hesi
tancy in recommending it to practitioners, as well as to
the students for whose needs it

about

was

evidently primarily

hundred, which,
opinions,
prepared.
tered throughout, are given in full, do not occupy a dis
proportionate part of the 1029 pages. The number of addi
tional cases cited or quoted from cannot be readily de
The

termined,

since

not

scat

one

all of them

are

referred

to

in the

table of cases, but the number is large. A detailed table
of contents is supplemented by an index.
WALTER L. NossAMAN

Legal Reasoning. By EDWARD H. LEVI.
Impression. Chicago: University of Chicago
London:
Press;
Cambridge University Press. 1950. Pp.
iv + 74. $2.00.

An Introduction

to

Second

This book marks

jurisprudence.
that it is

mere

an

important

advance in "realist"
Frank

Professor Levi holds with Jerome
"folklore" to regard law as "a system of

known rules applied by a judge" and legal reasoning as
consisting in the subsumption of a new case under a
given fixed rule. But for him this overthrow of our
traditional jurisprudence does not annihilate all j uris
prudence; it does not reduce the legal process to mere
guesswork or a calculation of the psychological or diges
tive factors operating within the individual judge. The
legal process is still a process of reasoning and legal con

cepts and rules

are

still the tools with which it works.

Legal reasoning, however, "has a logic of
reasoning involved in the legal
in which the classification changes as the
kind of

its own." "The
process is

one

classification is

reasoning can be an
law
forum is the most
"the
indeed,
and,
study

made." Nevertheless this kind of
of

object
explicit demonstration of the mechanism required for
a
moving classification system."
Legal reasoning is reasoning by example or analogy.
Competing examples, for instance, previous decisions,
are presented to the court and the court chooses which
it will apply. Its choice is ultimately a reflection of the
ideas generally prevailing in the time and place to which
it belongs, but its decision is not necessarily expressed

decision

new

decline

to

of these ideas. The

terms

legal

the

by adding something reshapes

changes

law of

general

a

case

to

and

growth

be traced. Professor Levi illustrates his

can

em

process

rules, concepts and classifications.

rule, and the classifications thus change from

he

As the author is careful

in

mechanism of

mean

three brilliant historical studies of case-law, statu
and constitutional interpretation. In
interpretation
tory
the first stage (we take only his account of case-law,
illustrated from the

concerning dangerous chattels)

cases

fumbles its way towards a classifica
which
will
help in the practical task of deci
tory concept
sion. In the second stage, having found what seems a
a

succession of

courts

practically useful concept, for instance, that of "inherent
ly dangerous things," the courts proceed to apply it in
a line of cases, filling up its categories with particular in
stances, until the dangerous list comprises "a loaded gun,
possibly a defective gun, mislabelled poison, defective
hairwash, scaffolds, a defective coffee urn and a defective
aerated bottle," while the nondangerous list includes "a
defective carriage, a bursting lamp, a defective balance
wheel for

a

circular

saw

and

a

defective boiler." Then

in the last stage of the process the courts, feeling
the judgments in MacPherson v. Buick) that

classification is

getting

out

rather that social life is

classification, begin to
principle or rule, and,

of touch with social

getting

cast

(as

in

their

life,

or

of touch with their

out

about for

higher

a

wider

or

so, the concept which
they
hitherto has served them gradually falls into disuse. But
a

principle (such as was
is of
v. Pender)
new principle neces
The
application.

broad formulation of the

attempted by
no

new

Brett M.R. in Heaven

for direct

use

do

as

own
concepts and thus involves the
need for further classification. The decision in Donoghue

sarily

embodies its

v. Stevenson, for instance, contained many possibilities
of future distinctions-distinctions as to degree of prox
imity or degree of control, distinctions between articles

between obvious and latent

inj ury and
of

mere

thought

courts

until

external use,

consumption and articles for

for internal

may
new

dangers,

pecuniary loss, and
on

occasion have

between

so on.

to

be

bases for classification

personal

All these lines

explored by
are

the

settled. And

topics of

.he process goes on. One can think of other
case-law, for instance, the history of restraints
so

on

trade
which

following upon Rylands Fletcher,
analysis would seem equally apt. It cer
tainly deserves extensive and thorough testing, for, if
sound, it opens the way to a new understanding of the
or

the

to

v.

cases

Professor Levi's

common

law and its method.

Professor Levi's illustrations of the

judicial

process

statutory interpretation (the Mann Act) and
constitutional interpretation (the "commerce clause") are
equally brilliant and suggestive. Here too the process is

applied

to

in broad lines the same, but with differences. For in
stance, a judge is not so free in dealing with a statute
or even

with

interpretative precedent

as

he is with pre-

( Continued

on

page 10)
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Federal Tax
We

failed,

in the Autumn

Campbell, Michael J. Sporer of Arthur Ander
Company, Harry B. Sutter of Hopkins, Sutter,

Swain and

Conference

and

sen

Quarter issue of THE RECORD,

report on the fifth annual Federal Tax Conference held
in October under the auspi.ces of The Law School, the
School of Business, and University College. Alumni
readers of Taxes magazine will have seen the December

to

Halls, DeWolfe and Owen, and the School of Business'

Royal S. Van
Highlights

de W oestyne.
of the Conference

were

discussion of "Directions in Which Tax
Have Been

Moving,"

an

Randolph Paul's
Policy and Law

of "The

appraisal

tion of the Bureau of Internal Revenue"

Miller,

and Leo A. Diamond's

Reorganiza
Robert N.

by

of "Gifts

analysis

to

Minors."

Book

Reviews

(Continued [rom page 4)

case-law, because all the words
operative and none can be treated as mere
dictum; nevertheless they nearly always admit differ
ences of
interpretation. A written Constitution such as
that of the United States, however, increases the freedom
of the courts in as much as it opens the possibility of
appealing from precedent or statute to the higher law
cedents in the realm of

of

The

Fifth

Federal Tax

Conference

a

statute

are

of the Constitution, and a written Constitution, express
ing in broad language the ideals of its age, "must be

in session

in its

enormously ambiguous

general provisions."

Such in the author's view is the
issue which

reported

the

proceedings

and

printed

a num

ber of the papers given at the conference. But we want to
tell the alumni generally about this fifth and largest (thus

far)

conference

on

federal taxation.

topics ranged from "Shifting Income within the
Family Group" to "Practical Legal Aspects of Tax Ac
counting," and fifteen different subjects filled the three
days of meetings. The Planning Committee under the
chairmanship of Robert R. Jorgensen of Sears, Roebuck
and Company included The Law School's Walter J.
Blum, William M. Emery of McDermott, Will and
Emery, William N. Hahhad of Bell, Boyd, Marshall and
Lloyd, James D. Head of Winston, Strawn, Black and
Towner, William A. McSwain of Eckhart, Klein, McThe

reasoning and such
studied.

Obviously

uncertain and hard

from the
to

have

our

the lines

are

predict;

single

us

but

we

have

the

ordinary

hope

no

old comfortable faith in law

as

an

man's desire for

and bow

to

leave this

question unanswered.

we

cannot

its

predict

of

be

science

a

in the

accept the law
Levi does not

In the first

the choice which

regaining

exact

certainty

Why then do we
compulsion? Professor

conduct of his affairs.

if

case must

may have been rescued

we

confusion into which other realists seemed

utter

plunged

satisfying

legal

which it should be

its results in any
to

of

true nature

on

place,

even

will in

court

a

make between

competing analogies, legal
particular
the
parties and the community by
procedure "protects
sure that the
competing analogies are before
making
in this sense the parties as well as the court
the court
participate in the law making. In this sense, also, lawyers
case

...

represent more than the litigants." In the second place,
much of the law is at any moment reasonably certain. It
is

only

of the

the

area

court

forth. The

of doubt that calls for the intervention

and "the

probable

foreshadowed

area

area

of

of doubt is

expansion

or

constantly

the system works. This is the
of system which will work when people do
as

set

contraction is

only
not

kind
agree

completely."
The publishers
note

are not
wrong when they say in their
that "this volume will be of interest and value to

students of
as

to

concerned with

[, Blum, Robert N. Miller, and
right:
with
participants at the Fifth Annual
Randolph Paul,
Federal Tax Conference.
Left

to

Walter

political philosophy, as well
legal profession and to everyone
problems of government and j urispru

logic,

ethics and

members of the

dence." Few volumes of such small bulk contain
matter

for

so

much

thought.
A. H. CAMPBELL

